In dynamic threshold schemes the dealer is able (after a preprocessing stage) to allow sets of participants of a given cardinality to reconstruct di erent secrets (in di erent time instants) by sending them the same broadcast message. In this paper we provide a tight lower bound on the number of random bits needed by the dealer to set up a dynamic threshold scheme.
Introduction
There are many situations in cryptography in which it is important to be able to generate random numbers, random bit strings, etc. For example, cryptographic keys are to be generated at random from a speci ed keyspace, and the use of a natural source of random bits, such as an unbiased coin, a radioactive source or a noise diode, is absolutely essential. Since random bits are a natural computational resource, the amount of randomness used in a computation is an important issue in many applications. Therefore, considerable e ort has been devoted to reduce the number of random bits used by probabilistic algorithms 9, 15] , to study weak random sources 28, 29] , to construct di erent kind of small probability spaces (which sometimes even allow to eliminate the use of randomness) 17, 21] , and 2 to analyze the amount of randomness required in order to achieve a given performance 18, 19] . Generating random bits by means of coin tosses or other physical processes is time-consuming and expensive, so in practice it is common to use a pseudo-random bit generator that expands a short random bit-string into a much longer \random-looking" bit string. Thus, a pseudo-random bit generator reduces the amount of random bits required in an application.
The Shannon entropy of the random source generating the random bits represents the most general and natural measure of randomness. Indeed, Knuth and Yao 16] have shown that the entropy of a random variable X (i.e., of a memoryless random source) is approximatively equal to the average number of tosses of an unbiased coin necessary to simulate the outcomes of X. For this and other interesting relations of the Shannon entropy with other measures of complexity, like Kolmogorov complexity, we advice the reader to consult the very readable account given in 10].
A secret sharing scheme is a technique to share a secret s among a set P of participants in such a way that only quali ed subsets, pooling together their information, referred to as shares, can reconstruct the secret s; but, subsets of participants that are not enabled to recover the secret have no information on it. Secret sharing schemes are useful in any important action that requires the concurrence of several designated people to be initiated, such as launching a missile, opening a bank vault or even opening a safety deposit box. Secret sharing schemes are also used in the management of cryptographic keys and multi-party security protocols (see 1] and 13]).
Secret sharing schemes were introduced by Blakley 2] and Shamir 22] . They analyzed (k; n) threshold schemes. In such schemes any set X P, where jPj = n, of k or more participants can recover the secret, but, sets of cardinality less than k have no information on it. The survey by Stinson 24] contains an uni ed description of results in the area of secret sharing schemes. The reader can also pro tably see the book 26]; while, for an updated bibliography on secret sharing schemes we refer the reader to 25]. Simmons 23] rst pointed out the practical relevance of secret sharing schemes having the feature of being able, after some preprocessing stage, to allow the participants to reconstruct di erent secrets (in di erent time instants) by sending 3 to all participants the same broadcast message. Blundo, Cresti, De Santis, and Vaccaro 5] established a formal setting to study such schemes, referred to as dynamic threshold schemes. Blakley, Blakley, Chan, and Massey 3] and Martin 20] considered the problem of constructing secret sharing schemes with disenrollment capability in which, by sending a broadcast message to all participants, a new secret is activated and a participant is disenrolled from the scheme. Harn, Hwang, Laih, and Lee 14] gave an algorithm to construct dynamic threshold schemes, in which, for a xed k, all sets of size at least k are allowed by the dealer to recover di erent secrets in di erent time instants. The recovering is permitted by sending the same broadcast message to all of them. Sun and Shieh 27] also analyzed dynamic threshold schemes. Blundo 4] generalized the model proposed in 27] and provided a simpler scheme, which is more e cient from a computational point of view and uses smaller broadcast messages than that in 27].
The quantitative study of the number of random bits needed by secret sharing schemes has been initiated in 6], where the optimality of several secret sharing schemes according to this measure has been proved. Some other result on this topic can be found in 7, 8, 11, 12] .
In this paper we analyze the amount of randomness needed to set up a dynamic threshold scheme, measured by the entropy of the probability space from which the shares to be given to participants and the broadcast messages to be issued are taken. In particular, we prove a lower bound on the number of random bits needed to set up a dynamic threshold scheme. This bound is tight as in 4] it has been provided a protocol for dynamic threshold schemes using exactly this number of random bits.
Information Theory Background
In this section we review the basic concepts of Information Theory used in our de nitions and proofs. For a complete treatment of the subject the reader is advised to consult 10].
In this paper with a boldface capital letter, say X, we denote a random variable taking value on a set denoted by the corresponding capital letter X according to some probability distribution fPr X (x)g x2X . The values such a random variable can take are denoted by the corresponding lower letter.
Given a probability distribution fPr X (x)g x2X on a set X, the Shannon entropy of X, denoted by H(X), is de ned as H(X) = ? X x2X Pr X (x) log Pr X (x) (all logarithms in this paper are to the base 2). The entropy H(X) is a measure of the average uncertainty one has about which element of the set X has been chosen when the choices of the elements from X are made according to the probability distribution fPr X (x)g x2X . It is well known that H(X) is a good approximation to the average number of bits needed to faithfully represent the elements of X. The entropy satis es the following property 0 H(X) jXj;
where H(X) = 0 if and only if there exists x 0 2 X such that Pr X (x 0 ) = 1; whereas, H(X) = log jXj if and only if Pr X (x) = 1=jXj for all x 2 X.
Given two sets X and Y and a joint probability distribution on their cartesian product, the conditional entropy H(XjY), is de ned as
Pr Y (y)Pr(xjy) log Pr(xjy):
From the de nition of conditional entropy it is easy to see that H(XjY) 0:
(1)
We have that H(XjY) = 0 when the value taken from Y completely determines the value chosen from X; whereas, H(XjY) = H(X) means that choices from X and Y are independent, that is, the probability that the value x has been chosen from X given that from Y we have chosen y is the same as the a priori probability of choosing x from X. Therefore, knowing the values chosen from Y does not enable a Bayesian opponent to modify an a priori guess regarding which element has been chosen from X. Given n + 1 sets X 1 ; : : :; X n ; Y and a joint probability distribution on their cartesian product, the entropy of X 1 : : : X n given Y can be expressed as H(X 1 : : : X n jY) = H(
H(X i jX 1 : : :X i?1 Y):
The mutual information I(X; Y) between X and Y is de ned by
and satis es I(X; Y) 0; from which one gets H(X) H(XjY): (4) Given n + 2 sets X; Y; Z 1 ; : : : ; Z n and a joint probability distribution on their cartesian product, the conditional mutual information I(X; YjZ 
From (2) and (5) one easily gets that for any sets X 1 ; : : :; X n ; Y; Z and a joint probability distribution on their cartesian product it holds that I(X 1 : : :X n ; YjZ) = I(X 1 ; YjZ) + n X i=2 I(X i ; YjX 1 : : : X i?1 Z);
and, for i = 1; : : : ; n, I(X; Y 1 : : : Y n jZ) I(X; Y i jZ): (8) 3 Dynamic Threshold Schemes
In this section we recall the de nition of dynamic threshold scheme given in 4]. In dynamic threshold schemes the dealer is able (after a preprocessing stage) to allow sets of participants of a given cardinality, say k, to reconstruct m di erent secrets (each secret in a di erent time instant), by sending to the participants the same broadcast message. The security of dynamic threshold schemes we consider is unconditional since they are not based on any computational assumption.
Let P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P n g be the set of participants and let SC = S 1 S m be the set where the secrets are chosen from (the i-th secret to be shared is chosen 6 in S i ). Let SC 4 = fPr SC (s 1 ; : : :; s m )g (s 1 ;:::;sm)2SC be a probability distribution on SC. The dealer in the preprocessing stage, knowing the probability distribution on SC, generates and distributes the shares to participants in P. Afterwards, in the broadcasting stage, the dealer having as input the i-th secret s i 2 S i , randomly chosen accordingly to fPr S i (s i )g s i 2S i which is induced by SC , and the shares of participants, computes a message b i and broadcasts it to all participants. At the end of the broadcasting stage, only the subsets of participants of cardinality at least k are able to recover s i , whereas any subset of participants of size less than k has absolutely no information on any secret, even after seeing all previous broadcast messages.
Let a dynamic threshold scheme for secrets in SC be xed. For any participant P 2 P, let us denote by K(P) the set of all possible shares given to participant P. Suppose a dealer D wants to share the secrets (s 1 ; : : :; s m ) 2 SC among the participants in P (we will assume that D 6 2 P). He does this by giving each participant P 2 P a share from K(P) chosen according to some, non necessarily uniform, probability distribution. Given a set of participants X = fP i 1 ; : : : ; P ir g P, where i 1 < i 2 < < i r , let K(X) = K(P i 1 ) K(P ir ). For any i = 1; : : : ; m, denote by E(B i ) the set of all possible broadcast messages enabling a set of participants of cardinality at least k to recover the i-th secret.
Any dynamic threshold scheme for secrets in SC and a probability distribution on SC naturally induce probability distributions on K(A) and on E(B i ), for any A P and for any i = 1; : : : ; m, respectively. Denote such probability distributions by fPr A (a)g a2K(A) and by fPr B i (b i )g b i 2E(B i ) , respectively. Finally, for i = 1; : : : ; m, denote by H(S i ) and by H(B i ) the entropy of fPr S i (s i )g s i 2S i and fPr B i (b i )g b i 2E(B i ) , respectively, and denote by H(A) the entropy of fPr A (a)g a2K(A) , for any A P.
As done in 4], we de ne (k; n; m) dynamic threshold schemes as follows.
De nition 3.1 Let P be a set of n participants and let m and k n be positive integers. A (k; n; m) dynamic threshold scheme is a sharing of secrets in S 1 S m among participants in P in such a way that, for i = 1; : : :; m, the following properties are satis ed.
1. Before knowing the i-th broadcast message all the participants, even knowing all the previous broadcast messages, have no information about the i-th secret: Formally, it holds that H(S i jP 1 : : : P n B 1 : : :B i?1 ) = H(S i ).
2. After seeing the i-th broadcast message, any subset of participants of cardinality greater than or equal to k can recover the i-th secret:
Formally, for all X P such that jXj k, it holds that H(S i jXB i ) = 0.
3. After seeing the i-th broadcast message, any subset of participants of cardinality less than k, even knowing all the previous broadcast messages and all the previous secrets, has no information on the i-th secret:
Formally, for all X P such that jXj < k, it holds that H(S i jXB 1 : : : B i S 1 : : : S i?1 ) = H(S i ).
Dynamic threshold schemes are de ned by using the entropy function mainly because this leads to a compact and simple description of the schemes and because the entropy approach takes into account all probability distributions on the secrets.
An immediate consequence of De nition 3.1 is that the secrets must be independent, as stated by the next lemma. Thus, the lemma holds.
From Properties 1 and 2 of De nition 3.1 we get the following lemma, which states that the conditional mutual information between S i and B i , given the shares held by all participants and the previous broadcast messages, is equal to the entropy H(S i ). 8 Lemma 3.3 Let P be a set of n participants and let k and m be integers such that k n. In any (k; n; m) dynamic threshold scheme, it holds that Thus, the lemma holds.
The following theorem, proved in 4], states a lower bound on the size of the information that any participant holds in any (k; n; m) dynamic threshold scheme. Theorem 3.4 ( 4]) Let P be a set of n participants and let k and m be integers such that k n. Let X P be such that jXj = k ? 1. In any (k; n; m) dynamic threshold scheme for any participant P 2 P, it holds that H(PjX) An immediate consequence of Theorem 3.4 is that in any (k; n; m) dynamic threshold scheme the entropy of any participant P 2 P satis es H(P) P m i=1 H(S i ). This observation will be useful in determining a lower bound on the randomness in any (k; n; m) dynamic threshold scheme.
4 Randomness in Dynamic Threshold Schemes
In this section we de ne and analyze the measure for the amount of randomness needed to realize a (k; n; m) dynamic threshold scheme.
The measure for the amount of randomness is formally de ned using the Shannon entropy of the random variables generating the shares and the broadcast messages. The entropy is strictly related to the measure of randomness introduced by Knuth and Yao 16] . Let A be an algorithm that generates the probability distribution fPr X (x)g x2X using only independent and unbiased random bits in input.
Denote by T(A) the average number of random bits used by the algorithm A and let T(X) = min A T(A). Knuth H(X) T(X) < H(X) + 2:
Thus, the entropy of a random source is very close to the average number of independent unbiased random bits necessary to simulate the source.
The total randomness present in a (k; n; m) dynamic threshold scheme on a set P = fP 1 ; : : :; P n g of participants is equal to the entropy H(P 1 : : :P n B 1 : : :B m ). This takes into account also the randomness H(S 1 : : : S m ) of the secrets the dealer wants to update, as we will see later. The dealer's randomness is the randomness needed by the dealer to set up a (k; n; m) dynamic threshold scheme for secrets in SC = S 1 S m , that is, the randomness he uses to generate the shares and the broadcast messages, given that the probability distribution SC 
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= fPr SC (s 1 ; : : : ; s m )g (s 1 ;:::;sm)2SC on the secrets is known. The amount of randomness required by the dealer to set up a (k; n; m) dynamic threshold scheme , when the secrets to be shared are chosen in SC according to the probability distribution SC , is de ned as R (k; n; m); SC ; ] = H(P 1 : : : P n B 1 : : : B m jS 1 : : :S m ): Notice that R (k; n; m); SC ; ] depends also on , since the probability that users receive given shares and that the broadcast messages assume given values depends both on and H(S 1 : : : S m ). Since we are interested in the minimum amount possible of randomness, we give the following de nition.
De nition 4.1 Let P be a set of n participants and let k and m be integers such that k n. Let where T is the space of all probability distributions SC on the sets of secrets SC and D is the space of all (k; n; m) dynamic threshold schemes for secrets in SC.
The total randomness and the dealer's randomness are related by the following lemma.
is greater than or equal to k P m i=1 log q i . This bound is tight, as in 4] it has been presented a protocol for dynamic threshold schemes using exactly this number of random bits. We need the following technical lemma. (1) and (5) Thus, the lemma holds.
The following theorem states a tight lower bound on the randomness required to realize any (k; n; m) dynamic threshold scheme. Theorem 4.4 Let P be a set of n participants and let k and m be integers such that k n. In any (k; n; m) dynamic threshold scheme for secrets chosen in Let y i;j = f i (j) be the i-th part of the share of P j For 1 j n Let w j = (y 1;j ; y 2;j ; ; y m;j ) be the share of participant P j .
Output: The shares w 1 ; w 2 ; : : :; w n of participants P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :; P n , respectively.
Broadcasting It is easy to see that the previous protocols realize a (k; n; m) dynamic threshold scheme. Indeed, notice that the m polynomials f i (x)'s are independently constructed. Hence, at time i, all the participants can compute, by using Lagrange's interpolation, the value f i (0), but, even knowing all the previous broadcast messages, since they do not know the broadcast message b i they cannot recover the secret s i . Any set X of at least k participants can compute f i (0). Hence, from b i = s i +f i (0) mod q i the participants in X can compute s i . On the other hand, any set X of less than k participants, even knowing all the previous broadcast messages and all the previous secrets, cannot interpolate the polynomial f i (x), thus f i (0) is equally likely to be any value in GF(q i ). Hence, the participants in X do not have any information on the secret s i . It easy to check that this scheme meets the bound of Theorem 4.5. Indeed, the dealer's randomness present in the scheme is k P m i=1 log q i , which is the randomness used by the dealer to choose the coe cients of the m polynomials. Since the choice of the secrets s 1 ; :::; s m requires P m i=1 log q i random bits, then the total randomness present in the scheme is (k+1) P m i=1 log q i .
